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Klein Reports

Cuban Story

(The writer, who is editor of the San Diego Union, was Press Secretary for Vice President Nixon during the 1960 Presidential campaign.)

By HERBERT G. KLEIN Copley News Service

This is a story we of the Nixon staff couldn't tell during the 1960 Presidential campaign.

It is the story of the Cuban issue which the former Vice President has discussed briefly in his new book, "Six Crises," and which. was disputed his past week by the President.

From the start of the 1960 campaign many of us were convinced that Cuba gaild be the deciding issue in a diese election. Certainly, in retroffiect, it was one of the decisive fulfors in what was the closest Pitsidential election of modern blittery.

Only four of us in the Nixon staff shared the secret that refugee troops were being trained for an eventual assault on Castro and a return wi Cuba. We had stern instruction, not to talk about this, and, destite many temptations, we protected security by remaining siler//

For s/long time, as we cam-paigned across the country, we held the hope that the training worzaje capidly enough to permatth has anding. The defeat have been a powernillactor for Richard Nixon and it will have been possible to rever liet new Vice President quite 1959) had in a memo House analyzed Cas-Make incredibly naive **\\U**scipline.'

also have told of his he ling the tougher policy:

Frequently we debated am ourselves the handling of the Cura Kennedy Broke ourselves the handing of the Curse ban issue within security bonds."

We heard the rumor that the Ken-We heard the rumor that the Kennedy staff feared the beach assault would take place before the election. Why, on Oct. 20, Mr. Kennedy proposed direct intervention.

> For the Vice President and his staff, the angriest moments of the: campaign took place on Oct. 20 on the eve of the fourth television debate. We wer**e in New York** when Mr. Kennedy, late in the day, made a proposal which directly outlined the exact program which was being carried out and which we had, for security reasons, kept secret.

> Here is what we thought had happened:

First: On July 23 Allen Dulles, then head of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Mr. Kennedy. had concurred in announcing that he had been briefed in depth, with particular emphasis on Cuba and Africa. Nothing was withheld, the two told reporters. And we knew that this was in accord with orders given Mr. Dulles by President Eisenhower.

Second: Nixon had captured the initiative on the Cuban issue with his Miami statement urging a quarantine against Castro. And, in the best-coordinated part of the campaign, the administration had followed with quick orders putting this into effect.

It seemed obvious to us that Mr; Kennedy, after realizing he was losing points at a crucial point of the campaign, was striking back, with secret material he had been given at the Dulles briefing. The; White House was queried and we were told Mr. Kennedy had been informed about the troop training. Others told us President Eisenhower was angry over the disclos-

In the light of what I knew of ettimunism or under com- happenings at that time, I was. of course, surprised last week at Mr. Dulles' statement which cori roborates President Kennedy's po As i jed to the train- sition that he wasn't told about the troop training.